[Editor's note: This article was written 5 years ago on the 40th anniversary of the six day war when I heard Dalia Rabin, the daughter of the late Yitzhak Rabin, and Eitan Haber speak at a conference in Herzlia. It seems fitting to reprint it now, the 45th anniversary of the war. Attorney Dalia Rabin, former Member of Knesset (1999-2003), chairperson of the Rabin Center and her brother Yuval Rabin, are both signatories to the Israeli Peace initiative launched this April 2011 . Businessman Yuval Rabin is in fact one of the authors of the initiative, which calls of a two state solution. The list of signatories of the intiitative can be found here http://israelipeaceinitiative.com/israeli-peace-initiative-english/signatories/ and the summary of the text for the peace plan is reprinted at the bottom of this article and can be found here: http://israelipeaceinitiative.com/israeli-peace-initiative-english/summary/]
DALIA RABIN AND EITAN HABER; REVISITING THE SIX DAY WAR: THE LEGACY OF YITZHAK RABIN
by Rhonda Spivak, 2007
“I was 17 years old during the six day war and I remember the hareda ( fear) of an existential threat on Israel…I heard the war on a transistor radio and I remember that my father returned home only on shabbat at the end of the war..and on Shabbat they announced the names of the soldiers who had fallen ,” recalls Dalia Rabin, the daughter of the late Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin, who was the I.D.F Chief of Staff in 1967.
In describing the mood in the country leading up to the war, Dalia Rabin said “ There was despair …The sense was that the last person out would turn out the lights.”
Rabin, who is currently the chairperson for the Yitzhak Rabin Center for Israel Studies, spoke at an international conference marking the 40th anniversary of the six-day-war at the Herzylia Interdisciplary Center. Prior to leading the Rabin Center, Dalia Rabin was elected to the Knesset for the Center party in 1999 and acted as chairperson of the Ethics Commmittee. She is an attorney by profession .
In describing the “euphoria” after the victory in 1967, Dalia Rabin, said that there was a sense that “we did the unbelievable” and that “the nation felt there had been a real miracle, the economy flourished and the world looked at us differently.” In her view, Israel experienced a similar feeling when her father signed the Oslo Accords and the peace process gained momentum. “Before the peace process there had been a crisis of confidence [in the country], but with the peace process the economy flourished and our image was better…The notion of seeing a democratic Israel at peace [with its neighbors] was my father’s dream.”
Eitan Haber, spoke at the conference about what he believes was Itzhak Rabin’s true legacy as the I.D.F. Chief of Staff during the six -day war. Haber was the director of the Prime Minister’s Bureau for Yitzhak Rabin from 1992 until 1995.
According to Haber, who is currently a member of the editorial board for Yediot Achronot, the overriding principal which served as the basis for all of the security decisions that Itzhak Rabin made was “the spilling of the least amount of blood.”
“For all of the years that I knew Yitzhak Rabin from 1958 until the time of his death, I see one common thread in regard to the security decisions he took---and that was that he always tried to spill the least amount of Israeli blood as possible,’ said Haber.
“ There are others who think less about the spilling of blood than Rabin did...Rabin saved the lives of 100’s if not thousands.. .Moshe Dayan was a bit too hasty to go to battle..he was willing to go to battle bechol mechir (at all costs),” Haber said.
Haber contrasted Rabin’s performance as Chief of Staff in 1967 to that of Dan Halutz, who resigned as Chief of Staff after 2006's Second war in Lebanon. He said that “It is better to have a Chief of Staff [such as Rabin] who hesitates about going to war than one who pretends to know more than he does, and is too quick to go to war [such as Halutz].”
Haber said that in 1967 Rabin’s hesitations took place in the proceeding two to three weeks before the outbreak of war, because he was deliberating about how to do things in way “that would spill the least amount of Israeli blood.”
“I have read over the deliberations made in the weeks leading up to the war, and practically in every diyun (deliberation) they speak of the expected number of casualties,” Haber said.
In Haber’s view, the day that Itzhak Rabin went to his home immediately prior to the war, which has since been referred to as Rabin’s “nervous or physical breakdown”, should be seen as part of the intense “in –depth” deliberations he took before going to war. “The notion of expected casualties weighed heavily on him,” Haber added. Rabin collapsed because of his sense of responsibility and anxiety before the war, unlike Dan Halutz in 2006 who went to war without blinking an eye, and without the ‘in-depth deliberations.”
It is indeed appropriate to reflect upon the lessons of the six-day-war especially in light of the aftermath of the Second Lebanon war. There are many who believe that since Dan Halutz knew that most of the field divisions in the I.D.F were not properly trained for battle and that emergency supplies were low, Israel should have taken similar steps to those it took prior to the six-day war. It could have issued an ultimatum demanding the return of the abducted soldiers, commenced a waiting period during which reserves could be called up, the infantry units trained and the emergency stocks replenished. Then and only then could it have delivered a significant blow to Hizbollah.
After Haber spoke, a journalist from the United States came to ask him a question. His response was very memorable “That’s a difficult question. You can’t expect me to answer that until I have a piece of cake and a cup of coffee.” Hearing this I decided not to approach Haber with my question until he’d eaten several cookies, and was in good spirits.
Haber actively supported Ehud Barak in his previous bid to become leader of the Labour party, and is often credited with having been responsible behind the scenes for ensuring that Barak became Prime Minister. However, when I asked Haber who he would be supporting as the new leader of the Labour party, he answered, “ I am not officially supporting anyone. ..I am not involved…I am not saying anything.”
One can only guess how disappointed Haber must have been with Barak’s performance as Prime Minister last time if he is not actively supporting Barak this time around.
Summary of The Israeli Peace Initiative
April 6, 2011
In light of the continuing political stalemate over the past years, and especially in view of the current dramatic events that are taking place in the area, and their effect on the State of Israel, its security and its international status, we call upon the government of Israel to make a courageous decision and take the initiative, the purpose of which is to advance a regional peace agreement in the Middle East, to strengthen the security of Israel in the tumultuous region and its problematic international standing.
We call upon the government to present a framework for the conclusion of the Israel-Arab conflict, as a comprehensive response to the 2002 Arab peace initiative. Israel must decide on its future from a position of strength and not to be dragged along by events.
We present the public and its elected representatives with our proposal for an Israel Peace Initiative, which has been developed over the past years with the aid of Israeli experts, based on the known solutions to all the basic problems in the area (for example, the Clinton parameters, the proposals put forth Barak at Camp David, the Olmert and Livni understandings in the framework of the Annapolis process, the talks with Syria from the time of Rabin, Netanyahu, Barak till Olmert). We have a strong basis to believe that the initiative will be accepted favorably by the Arab capitals and the Palestinian leadership.
We hope that brave leaders will be found in Israel, in the area and in the international community who will translate the Arab and Israeli vision for peace into reality, instead of waiting for vain magic to take place.
Following are the main principles of our proposal:
Israel will accept the Arab initiative of 2002 as a basis for negotiations for peace agreements in the area, and will present her ideas on the points of dispute.
Israel will announce that her strategic aim is to reach a permanent agreement with the Palestinian Authority, as well as permanent peace agreements with Syria and Lebanon that will put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of the following principles:
- A solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict through “two states for two peoples”, which shall form two nation states – one for the Jewish people and one for the Palestinian people (including the implementation of the Declaration of Independence from 1948 regarding the equality of Arab citizens in Israel).
- The establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the basis of the 1967 lines, and territory swaps on a 1:1basis, in limited scope.
- The Palestinian state will be demilitarized with control over its internal security, side by side with strict security measures on its borders.
- Jerusalem will be the capital of both peoples, whereas the Jewish neighborhoods, the Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter will be under Israeli sovereignty and the temple mount shall remain under a special no-sovereignty regime (“G-d sovereignty”) with special arrangements. Israeli Jerusalem will be acknowledged as the capital of Israel.
- An agreed upon solution regarding the problem of the refugees on the basis of financial compensation and their return to Palestinian territory only (with symbolic and agreed upon exceptions).
- An agreement with Syria that is based on the gradual withdrawal to the 1967 borders (similar to the model in Sinai), a 1:1 exchange of territories and broad security measures on the border.
- A peace agreement with Lebanon based on the UN decision 1701 and on significant security measures on the border.
- A commitment by Syria, Lebanon and Palestine to prevent terror and to discontinue cooperation with hostile entities and states.
- The establishment of regional security arrangements between Israel, Arab states and the international community.
- The building of regional economic development in order to ensure prosperity and stability among all the people of the area.
- The advancement of normal relations between Israel and the Arab world and Islamic countries will take place alongside progress in the negotiations, coupled with mutual commitment towards peace education and the prevention of incitement.
The Advantages of the Initiative
- The uniqueness of the initiative is that it provides an answer to the Arab initiative, with a wide perspective of the future of the area and not only regarding the topics of the conflict but from a strategic political, security and economic perspective.
- Israel demonstrates that she is ready for far-reaching concessions only if the recompense will be the conclusion of the conflict and the end to all claims alongside significant security measures.
- The actual announcement of the Israeli initiative will open channels to both new and old Arab leaders, will break the circle of isolation and international de-legitimization and will prevent international pressure and forced solutions.
- Israel is sending an important message to the Arab public in general and to its youth in particular, that she is a true partner for peace, democracy and economic prosperity in the area.
- It is possible to translate the initiative to progress in each channel simultaneously and without pre-conditions.
- It is possible to use the initiative as a framework for a permanent agreement or an agreed-upon political horizon in the context of interim agreements.